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Abstract. Martii Koskenniemi argues that human rights law is indeterminate, and that
arguments based on human rights unavoidably reflect the policy preferences of the
speaker. I connect this argument to empirical evidence of the failure of international
human rights treaties to improve human rights in countries that have ratified them. I
argue that many features of the human rights regime that are celebrated by lawyers—the
large number of treaties, the vast number of rights, the large amount of
institutionalization, and the involvement of NGOs—actually reflect the failure of the
regime. Governments tolerate these developments because they add to the indeterminacy
of the legal regime, freeing them to act in the public interest when they are motivated to
do so.

International law is a vast field governing countless relationships between states, yet a
very small part of it receives most of the attention—human rights. This may seem puzzling. The
treaties that created the human rights regime are no different from the treaties that created the
law of the sea and international trade law. Yet clearly people think about human rights law
differently from the rest of international law. Lawyers who discuss the law of the sea or
international trade law are likely, sooner or later, to ask whether the rules in those areas are
consistent with human rights norms, while human rights lawyers can discuss human rights law
without thinking about the law of the sea or the WTO. Many people insist that states are bound
to respect human rights even if they have not ratified the relevant treaties, or have ratified them
subject to reservations—while countries that do not belong to the WTO are not bound by its
rules. Some people believe that human rights law binds states even when states explicitly
repudiate it; human rights law is said to have a “constitutional” dimension.
An enormous infrastructure has grown up around human rights. Countless NGOs monitor
compliance with human rights in various countries. Governments routinely criticize each other
for violating human rights. An endless array of commissions, councils, committees, courts, and
offices attempt to administer the human rights treaties. While other treaty regimes also are
governed by international organizations (the WTO, the Law of the Sea Authority), no other area
of law has thrown up quite so many institutions, with complex, overlapping jurisdictions. It is
also hard to think of another area of international law where there is so much activity: so many
proposals for additional treaties, for expanding the scope of existing treaties, for strengthening
and constructing new institutions.
And yet the accomplishments of international human rights law seem rather slim.
Countries rarely try to enforce the treaties against each other—at least, in a systematic way. They
do not “retaliate” against each other for violating the treaties the way they often retaliate against
countries that violate trade law. Countries do threaten human-rights violators with sanctions from
1
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time to time, but they do not do so in a systematic way, and usually human rights violations are
offered as an excuse or redundant justification when the real basis for concern is a country’s
militarism or aggression. And most human-rights violators are left alone. The international
institutions that monitor human rights lack adequate staffing and funds, and with few exceptions
are deprived of formal legal authority. There is not much evidence that human rights law has
caused governments to improve respect for human rights.
What are we to make of this phenomenon? I will examine this question through the lens
of Martii Koskenniemi’s writings on human rights. His most focused writing on this topic can be
found in two chapters of The Politics of International Law. He is interested in the tension
between human rights discourse and the institutionalization of human rights. The discourse is
fluid and indeterminate. The institutions, by contrast, are rigid. As he argues:
[W]hile the rhetoric of human rights has historically had a positive and liberating effect
on societies, once rights become institutionalized as a central part of political and
administrative culture, they lose their transformative effect and are petrified into a
legalistic paradigm that marginalises values and interests that resist translation into
rights-language. 2
The reasons are complex. Human rights discourse is frequently indeterminate and, when it isn’t,
it privileges certain moral relations over others in an arbitrary fashion. Indeterminacy can be seen
in the ubiquitous problem of tradeoffs. When a person criticizes the government, his human right
to expression must be weighed against interference with the government’s legitimate activities,
like providing security. Indeed, these tensions can be characterized as conflicts between rights—
in this case, a conflict between the right to freedom of expression and the right to security—and
the human rights treaties provide no method for resolving such conflicts. The larger problem is
that governments have numerous responsibilities and limited resources. If they use some of their
resources to advance certain human rights, there will be fewer resources left over for advancing
other human rights or other legitimate interests of the public. There is no “recipe” for making
these tradeoffs and judgments. The morally correct result depends on context. 3
Worse, human rights law privileges certain moral values at the expense of others. So even
if a government properly respects human rights, it could end up causing other moral harms. For
example, in families moral claims are not based on rights but on relationships; there are
pervasive worries that conceptualizing family relationships in terms of rights (for example,
children have rights to love and support) mischaracterizes and damages them. In the United
States, a recent lawsuit by a teenager against her parents claiming that they were legally required
to pay her expensive high school tuition sparked widespread outrage. Although the plaintiff had
a weak case, the concern is that she would not have even brought the case but for a culture in
which everyone thinks about everything in terms of rights. A government that sought to protect
human rights in the family context may end up harming family relationships.
When human rights are institutionalized—and here Koskenniemi seems to have in mind
domestic legal and constitutional structures—the moral tradeoffs (the first problem) are put in
2
3

Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law 133 (2011).
Id., at 143.

the hands of courts and administrators who may make them improperly, reflecting self-interest,
the values of the elites, or institutional self-preservation, or resulting from error. The bureaucratic
enforcement of rights then leads to denigration of moral values that cannot be put into the
language of rights (the second problem).
The upshot is that although people who are treated unjustly often can advance their cause
by using the language of rights, once those rights are recognized, legalized, and institutionalized,
they become just one of a large number of rights that must be traded off against each other, often
with disregard to moral values not (yet) recognized as rights. This seems to be the petrification
that Koskenniemi alludes to. One might add that the problem is not just that other moral values
are not recognized, but that the institutions may, while recognizing many rights, not make the
right tradeoffs and thus effectively violate some or many of them.
Koskenniemi’s discussion is abstract; as I mentioned, he seems to have in mind a vaguely
defined human rights discourse that is partially legalized. In this essay, I bring down the level of
abstraction, and examine how his argument plays out in international law. My starting point is
evidence compiled over the last decade that suggests that international human rights law has
been ineffective. I will argue that the problem is not petrification of human rights but the
difficulty of eliminating discretion and tradeoffs. States are required to promote the public good
and resist the straitjacket of a rights regime that would interfere with this agenda. As a result,
states have deliberately ensured that international human rights law is vague, and that
international legal institutions are too weak to give it content. I argue that the failure can be
traced to a basic conceptual problem with rights. Because any effort to reduce the public good to
a short list of rights unavoidably skirts things that people care about, there will always be
constant pressure to increase the number of rights. This pressure comes from the public, NGOs,
political activists, and many other persons and organizations. But as the number of rights
increases (a phenomenon I call the “hypertrophy” of human rights), and it becomes more and
more necessary to make tradeoffs between them, it becomes harder to criticize countries for
failing to advance some rights rather than others. Paradoxically, the huge quantity of human
rights gives states immunity to criticism for violating them.
Some Evidence
Until recently, it was taken for granted among international lawyers that human rights
treaties advanced the cause of human rights. How could they not? Governments, NGOs, and
other institutions put a huge amount of effort into negotiating these treaties. They set up
committees, commissions, and courts to monitor compliance, interpret terms, and pester
governments that fail to live up to their obligations. Leaders of virtually all governments
regularly declare their devotion to human rights, and criticize other governments for violating
human rights. Thousands of NGOs have been formed by people who hope to hold their
governments and foreign governments to those governments’ human rights obligations. Aid may
be conditioned on human rights. Routine human-rights violators may be isolated. The
International Criminal Court was created to ensure that government officials responsible for the
worst human rights violations are held criminally accountable.

Over the decades, international human rights law has deeply penetrated domestic political
and legal institutions. Many governments have drafted new constitutions, and every new
constitution contains rights that can be traced to international documents. Domestic courts are
often empowered to enforce those rights. The European Court of Human Rights has taken the
lead in deepening and advancing the human rights regime. Roughly contemporaneous with the
rise of international human rights law, democracy spread from country to country, in a series of
waves that took place after World War II, during the 1970s, and during the 1990s. Today, most
countries are democracies, and even non-democracies must pay tribute to democratic ideals by
holding (fake) elections.
One of the most interesting features of the human rights regime is the rapid increase in
the number of human rights treaties, and the rapid increase in the number of internationally
recognized human rights (most but not all of them created by the treaties). Major treaties entered
into force in 1969, 1976 (two), 1981, 1987, 1990, 2003, 2008, and 2010. The number of rights
that came into existence expanded from 20 or so in the first treaty (depending on how one counts
them), to over 100 in 1976, more than 150 in the 1990s, to around 300 today. Or to put the point
differently, the range of human activities that are governed by international human rights law has
expanded greatly, so that today, nearly everything one might think of is formally governed by
human rights law—the family, the workplace, political institutions, religious organizations,
education, health, indigenous groups, disability, and on and on.
This might seem like a great triumph for human rights, but the picture becomes murkier
as one looks more closely at it. Human-rights monitors churn out dismal reports at an evergreater rate, and these reports show that human rights violations remain common in most
countries. Torture is used routinely to extract confessions or intimidate dissidents. Police use
extrajudicial killings to keep order or extract bribes. Women are treated extremely badly in all
but the most advanced western countries. In poor countries, children are forced to work and
denied adequate education. Health care is miserable. Religious freedom is limited. Press freedom
varies greatly even in democracies, as does the ability of the public to exercise its will through
political institutions.
The various international institutions charged with monitoring and enforcing the treaties
are starved for funds and routinely ignored by states. The treaty committees are marginal
institutions. The UN Human Rights Council is tainted by its human-rights violating members
who protect themselves from criticism. The European Court of Human Rights has presided over
the return of authoritarianism to Russia. And the effectiveness of domestic human-rights
institutions is questionable. Outside the west, most countries have weak and frequently corrupt
legal institutions.
And while democracy has indeed spread, and so has the incorporation of rights into
national constitutions, it seems hardly accurate to say that human rights—at least, in the
conventional western sense—play a dominant ideological or political role around the world.
Consider the ten most populous states, which in aggregate contain well over half the population
of the world. Of them, only the United States and (to a lesser extent) Japan could be considered a
liberal democracy where rights are widely respected. Russia and China are authoritarian
countries. India is a democracy and enjoys a free press, but culturally—with its lingering caste

system and mistreatment of women, especially in vast rural areas—it is about as far from liberal
as is possible. Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nigeria also would be well down on the list
of leading rights-respecting nations. Brazil, the best of the remaining lot, has enormous problems
like rampant extrajudicial killing.
Nor is there much evidence that the progress that has been achieved is related to
international law per se. The leading liberal democracies—the United Kingdom, the United
States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and so on—respected human rights
long before the international treaty regime was put into place in the 1970s. Some of these
countries can trace their commitment to human rights back to the Enlightenment. The causes of
recent conversions to human rights lie outside the law. The failure of numerous authoritarian
regimes—after World War I, World War II, and the Cold War—immensely bolstered the
prestige of democracy and human rights. Democracy and respect for human rights appears to be
correlated with economic growth—and there may well be a causal relationship running from
wealth to rights. Thus, the factors that cause countries to respect human rights appear to be
unrelated to international law.
Over the last 15 years, law professors and political scientists have attempted to test
rigorously the hypothesis that international human rights law improves respect for human rights.
This hypothesis implies that if a countries enters a human rights treaty, its human-rights
performance will improve at the same time or in the years afterwards. In fact, there is hardly any
evidence for this pattern, as Figure 1 illustrates.
Figure 1: Effect of ICCPR on Four Types of Rights
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The graph shows four types of human rights-related outcomes—freedom of speech, extrajudicial
killings, freedom of religion, and independence of the judiciary, as measured by a pair of

respected political scientists, where 0 is worst and 2 is best. 4 When a country ratifies the ICCPR,
it binds itself to recognize rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion—and so
measures of respect for those rights should increase. In addition, the country binds itself to
recognize the right to due process, and accordingly one would expect the country’s avoidance of
extrajudicial killings and the independence of its judiciary would improve. Yet the graph shows
that performance along these dimensions hardly budges. There is perhaps a small improvement
in the year leading up to ratification, but this improvement mostly erodes over the next several
years. Statistical studies that control for other factors like changes in the country’s wealth
confirm that treaty ratification does not affect a country’s human rights performance at a
statistically significant level. 5
The pattern for other treaties is roughly the same, though there is some variation.
Scholars have found some evidence that literacy rates for women improved in countries that
ratified CEDAW, for example. But respect for other rights go down after ratification. When there
are dozens or even hundreds of rights, random variation will ensure that some coefficients are
statistically significant. But the overall pattern is clear: treaty ratification either has no effect on
human rights, or a very small effect that is greatly at variance with all the attention given to
human rights.
Explanations
Why haven’t human rights treaties increased respect for human rights? There are a
number of familiar explanations. One is that countries do not really care about human rights, and
the treaties are a hypocritical exercise in propaganda. And the advanced liberal countries made
sure to design the treaties so that they ratified rights that those countries already recognized, so
no change in behavior was necessary. Another is that they do care about human rights, but not
very much, so while countries enter into human rights treaties in good faith, it turns out to be too
difficult to comply with them because of problems of entrenched interests, civil disorder, and so
forth. Wealthy and powerful countries that might be expected to enforce human rights in other
countries must contend with competing interests like security and geopolitical stability.
I want to explore a third possibility, one more closely in line with Koskenniemi’s claims.
Koskenniemi argues that rights become oppressive when they are institutionalized because they
marginalize certain interests that are not embodied in these rights. Part of the explanation is that
certain human values do not lend themselves to embodiment in rights. He mentions nationalistic
aspirations: many people feel that they have a duty to make sacrifices for the good of the nation,
but they do not believe that anyone else has a corresponding right to those sacrifices. Another
example perhaps is embodied in the idea of virtue. A person may feel that he has an obligation to
improve his talents without thinking that he has a right to do so. Family relations are notoriously
difficult to describe in the language of rights: does one spouse have a right to care and support
from the other spouse?

4

David L. Cingranelli, David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay, The CIRI Human Rights Dataset (2013),
http://www.humanrightsdata.org.
5
I discuss the evidence in Eric A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press,
forthcoming 2014).

Yet while these familiar objections to “rights-talk” carry some force, it is not clear that
they apply to the international human rights regime. After all, that regime has never demanded
that government disregard morality that is not embodied in rights. The idea from the start was to
create a set of minimum or basic rights, not to dictate the entire moral system. Governments can
pursue their own (or their population’s) vision of the good if they like without running afoul of
the human rights regime.
But there is a related possibility, which I have called “rights hypertrophy”—the
proliferation of human rights to the point that any specific human right loses its normative
content. 6 All countries have limited resources, whereas most rights—at least, if understood
naively—require a large expenditures for vindication. A country can stop torture and guarantee
due process only by investing resources in training police and judges, paying them adequately,
and investigating corruption. It is very hard to know what fraction of the country’s GDP must be
spent on these activities in order to vindicate the rights of criminal suspects. Everyone
understands that rights violations cannot be brought down to zero, and so the question becomes
how many rights violations can be tolerated for a country to be deemed in compliance with the
human rights treaties.
Meanwhile, this same hypothetical country must vindicate numerous other rights. It must
respect the right to free speech—which means providing security and crowd control for
demonstrations. It must respect the right to freedom of religion—which may mean providing
legal exemptions as well as protection for religious minorities. It must respect rights to education
and health—which means investing substantial resources in schools and medical clinics. It must
reduce discrimination against women—which again will require, especially in a traditional
society, massive investments in education, training, and protection. If, as is normally the case,
respect for rights requires a modern, well-funded legal system, then resources must go in that
direction as well. And while doing all of this, the government must maintain political support
among traditional groups and conservative citizens who object to these policies. And yet if
resources are limited—and they always are—then the country must make tradeoffs, and invest
less in vindicating rights than might seem appropriate in the abstract.
Anxieties based on these sorts of considerations have led many commentators to argue
that human rights should be arranged hierarchically, so countries are encouraged to address the
most important, like rights related to bodily integrity. But there has been no movement in this
direction. The reason for this is that most governments see their role as that of advancing the
general public good. Even cynical, corrupt, and authoritarian governments put some effort into
providing benefits to the public—even if they are more concerned with helping themselves and
their cronies—if only to prevent a revolution. The public good is typically understood as some
mixture of economic prosperity, security, and protection of values. Governments do best by
allocating resources to these goals in proportion to the marginal benefits that are available. If
torture exists because it is a deeply entrenched practice among local police, and no amount of
money spent on retraining will eliminate it, then it is better to use money to build schools and
medical clinics than throw it away on investigations and training programs that will not make a
dent in the torture problem. If spending more money on schools does not turn out to improve
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educational outcomes by very much, then at the margin money may be better spent on parks, or
better streets, or higher salaries for civil servants, or a stronger military.
Philosophers dislike rights hypotrophy because the proliferation of rights (including
rights to leisure and vacation) seems to trivialize the human rights project. 7 But it is a reasonable
for a government to spend resources on apparently trivial goods (vacation, leisure) if those
resources cannot on the margin purchase goods that might seem more significant or otherwise
more deeply connected to human well-being (bodily integrity, religious freedom). It is probably
for this reason that the list of rights continues to grow rather than contract. To rationalize
spending on parks when many people receive inadequate schooling or medical care, someone
will advocate a “right to parks,” or claim that park-building advances some other rights to leisure
or environmental well-being or some such thing. The flexibility of language combines with the
needs of policy to ensure that rights are indeterminate in practice. Governance is complicated;
good governance cannot be reduced to a list of obligations.
If all this is so, one can see why human rights treaties seem to be as entrenched as ever,
and indeed continue to be proposed and ratified, with the number of recognized rights increasing
all the time—while at the same time the treaties do not have measurable effect on the behavior of
countries. Countries add new treaties and new rights to make clear that they are not bound to a
short list of basic rights, including the liberal or negative rights touted by the United States in
particular, and can instead act with the flexibility that they believe necessary to meet public
needs. Commentators and scholars abet this activity by discovering new human interests that the
rights regime should protect. But the upshot is the treaties become unenforceable. It becomes
difficult to argue that a country violated a treaty X because it violated right Y, when the country
can reply that it cannot afford to respect right Y while also ensuring the vindication of rights W
and Z. These arguments are familiar. Many poor countries claim that they can exercise a right to
development in order to excuse their failure to comply with political rights. We may (or may not)
criticize these arguments on moral grounds, but the treaties themselves provide no resources for
criticism. If the treaties were (implausibly) interpreted to require countries to reduce all rights
violations to zero, then they would require the impossible, and countries can’t be asked to do the
impossible. But if, more plausibly, the treaties require countries to use “best efforts” or “good
faith” to reduce violations, and to make reasonable tradeoffs, then they provide no basis for
distinguishing countries that are in compliance and those that are not—putting aside extreme
cases like countries that commit genocide or (like North Korea) sustain totalitarian systems that
exploit and impoverish their populations.
One might respond to this argument by pointing out that many advanced countries
respect the human rights of their citizens, and the tradeoff problem does not render this promise
indeterminate, even when many rights can be bound in the constitution. In these countries,
people can tell when the government violates their rights, and can obtain redress in the courts.
But the difference between the domestic case and international law is that countries use
institutions to resolve conflicts about rights, to make whatever tradeoffs that are necessary.
Those institutions draw on their understanding of the public good and popular opinion in order to
make these tradeoffs, which are then embodied in law that is often (although not always)
predictable in application. The difficulty with international human rights is that no comparable
7
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institutions exist. International human rights institutions are feeble and lacking in legitimacy. The
reason for that is that legal institutions can operate only when they are trusted or at least accepted
by the public, and while populations in advanced states generally trust their domestic institutions,
they do not trust international institutions. And for that reason, governments cannot give
international institutions the resources and respect that would enable them to operate effectively.
The Sociology of the International Law Profession
Koskenniemi says little about the actual practices of states and treaty enforcement,
focusing instead on intellectual history. A major theme in his work is how international
lawyers—and especially international law scholars—think about international law. He argues
that international legal scholarship was traditionally joined to the Kantian tradition of liberal
cosmopolitanism, which gave legal scholars the ability to act as a “legal conscience” for the
international order. Meanwhile, international law was seen as an idealistic profession. But this
position was always in tension with the realities of the international order. The old ideals are
today in shambles. “Faith in progressive internationalism may have become impossible to
articulate in an intellectually respectable fashion.” 8 International legal practice increasingly
seems like a technical field with no specific normative valence.
Koskenniemi overstates the collapse of progressive thinking in international law. Maybe
he is so persuaded by his own critique of human rights scholarship—that it acts in bad faith by
presenting contested policy positions as though they reflect neutral, apolitical rights 9—that he
believes that others must agree with it. His critique is indeed persuasive, but in the United States,
at least, the progressive thinking he criticizes continues to dominate international law
scholarship. For every paper written about trade, the law of the sea, or state responsibility,
dozens or even hundreds are written about human rights. The human rights papers typically seek
to expand the reach of the human rights regimes—by defining existing rights broadly or
proposing new rights. Another enormous subject is international criminal law, where again the
goal is to legitimize, extend, and broaden the norms of international criminal law, so as to punish
human-rights violators. I know European scholarship less well, but it seems clear that human
rights is also a central feature of that scholarship, indeed, where there is a commonly asserted
view (still rare in the United States) that international human rights have become
“constitutionalized.”
Figure 2 shows the enormous increase in the frequency of law review articles in the
United States that mention the term “human rights.” It is a crude measure—since not all of these
articles are focused on human rights—but it seems intuitively right. Writing about human rights
received two boosts. The first was the Carter administration’s promotion of human rights in the
late 1970s, which was surprisingly adopted by the Reagan administration. The second was the
end of the Cold War, which suddenly seemed to make a cosmopolitan order based on western
human right principles possible.
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Figure 2: Frequency of Mention of “Human Rights” and Other Terms in Legal Articles 10
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What is true is that this type of scholarship is not taken very seriously by scholars outside
of international law, appears to have little influence on governments, and has been challenged in
recent years by empirically-oriented legal scholars and political scientists, who have, as I
explained above, provided evidence that human rights treaties have had little effect on the
behavior of states. The standard normative proposals to expand human rights and to strengthen
human-rights institutions have become increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of state
intransigence. Indeed, human rights scholarship has had little influence or respectability even in
U.S. law schools, which tend to ghettoize their international law scholars.
Conclusion
Koskenniemi’s focus on the arguments and beliefs of scholars obscures the radical
implications of his thinking for international law itself. Consider his claim that “if there is no
general recipe for the solution of rights conflicts, no single vision of the good life that rights
would express, then everything hinges on the appreciation of context, on the act of ad hoc
balancing, that is to say, on the kind of politics for the articulation of which rights leave no
room.” 11 If that is the case, then the human rights treaties cannot operate as they were intended.
A government acting in good faith to comply with a human rights treaty will take into account
“context,” and a government acting in bad faith can similarly claim that “context” explains why
it has made choices that observers may disapprove of. Any attempt to criticize a government for
violating a human rights treaty becomes a claim that the observer understands the “context”—the
complicated mixture of local values, threats, practicalities, and so on—better than the
government itself does, which is frequently implausible. International courts and other legal
institutions face a similar problem. If international human rights arguments are in the end policy
arguments, why should a state accept an international body’s policy judgments in preference to
those of its government or population? Should we be surprised that they don’t?
10
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I have tried to add to this account a description of the ways in which this dilemma has
worked itself out institutionally, and how it reveals in new (negative) light developments that
international lawyers have almost always celebrated.
The increase in the number of human rights treaties and human rights embodied in those
treaties is usually seen as a vindication of the human rights project. In fact, the multiplication of
rights reflects deep disagreement across countries about the priority that different human
interests should be given. It also undermines efforts to hold governments to account by
increasing their formal legal discretion to plead context and make ad hoc tradeoffs.
The growth in international legal organizations, like courts and commissions, that are
devoted to human rights is usually seen as a reflection of the international community’s
commitment to enforcing human rights. In fact, these institutions, which are starved for funds,
and granted conflicting jurisdictions and little or no legal power, weaken enforcement by
multiplying the number of interpretations of rights provisions, enabling states to select whichever
ones serve their interests.
The multiplication of human-rights NGOs—domestic and international—is usually seen
as an essential feature of the international human rights regimes, as NGOs perform important
monitoring and enforcement functions. In fact, human-rights NGOs all have different agendas
and causes; they frequently disagree with each other and offer different interpretations of
international human rights, often ignoring the treaties altogether. Many NGOs pursue right-wing
agendas at variance with the liberal spirit of the treaties. 12
The explosion of human-rights scholarship, almost all of it devoted to broad
interpretations of human rights law or calling for more rights and stronger institutions, is seen as
an important supplement to international human rights law. In fact, this scholarship has had little
influence on states. Government officials who read Koskenniemi 13 will rightly see it as political
advocacy, which they can disregard, rather than legal interpretation that they should take
seriously.
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Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but Not Defending) “Unconstitutional” Laws, October 2012
Lee Anne Fennell, Resource Access Costs, October 2012
Brian Leiter, Legal Realisms, Old and New, October 2012
Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Lnasberg-Rodriguez, and Mila Versteeg, When to Overthrow
Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World’s Constitutions, November 2012
Brian Leiter and Alex Langlinais, The Methodology of Legal Philosophy, November
2012
Alison L. LaCroix, The Lawyer’s Library in the Early American Republic, November
2012
Alison L. LaCroix, Eavesdropping on the Vox Populi, November 2012
Alison L. LaCroix, On Being “Bound Thereby,” November 2012
Alison L. LaCroix, What If Madison had Won? Imagining a Constitution World of
Legislative Supremacy, November 2012
Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Unemployment and Regulatory Policy, December
2012
Alison LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, January 2013
Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, January 2013
Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, February 2013
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, February 2013
Anup Malani and Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, February 2013
Ariel Porat and Lior Strahilevits, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big
Data, February 2013
Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, February 2013
Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution and the Spending Power, March 2013
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, March 2013
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System? March 2013
Nicholas G. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, March
2013
Aziz Z. Huq, The Social Production of National Security, March 2013
Aziz Z. Huq, Federalism, Liberty, and Risk in NIFB v. Sebelius, April 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Property in Housing, April 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, April 2013
William H. J. Hubbard, An Empiritcal Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on
Forum Shopping in the New York Courts, May 2013
Daniel Abebe and Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach,
May 2013
Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound,
June 2013
Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, and Richard H. McAdams, Libertarian Paternalism,
Path Dependence, and Temporary Law, June 2013
Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, June 2013
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Bernard Harcourt, Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: A Mirror of the History of
the Foundations of Modern Criminal Law, July 2013
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty
Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, July 2013
Christopher Buccafusco and Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An
Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, July 2013
Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional Court and SocioEconomic Rights as 'Insurance Swaps', August 2013
Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle Redux: On Same-Sex Marriage,
the Supreme Court’s Opinion in United States v. Windsor, John Stuart Mill’s essay On
Liberty (1859), and H.L.A. Hart’s Modern Harm Principle, August 2013
Brian Leiter, Nietzsche against the Philosophical Canon, April 2013
Sital Kalantry, Women in Prison in Argentina: Causes, Conditions, and Consequences,
May 2013
Becker and Foucault on Crime and Punishment, A Conversation with Gary Becker,
François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt: The Second Session, September 2013
Daniel Abebe, One Voice or Many? The Political Question Doctrine and Acoustic
Dissonance in Foreign Affairs, September 2013
Brian Leiter, Why Legal Positivism (Again)? September 2013
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, September 2013
Elizabeth Chorvat, Taxation and Liquidity: Evidence from Retirement Savings,
September 2013
Elizabeth Chorvat, Looking Through' Corporate Expatriations for Buried Intangibles,
September 2013
William H. J. Hubbard, A Theory of Pleading, Litigation, and Settlement, November
2013
Tom Ginsburg, Nick Foti, and Daniel Rockmore, “We the Peoples”: The Global Origins
of Constitutional Preambles, November 2013
Lee Anne Fennell and Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, December 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, December 2013
Jose Antonio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Presidentialism and
Parliamentarism, December 2013
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The South after Shelby County, October 2013
Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts: The Flawed Conceptual and Evidentiary Basis
of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy, November 2013
Tom Ginsburg, Political Constraints on International Courts, December 2013
Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity versus Noninfringement, December 2013
M. Todd Henderson and William H.J. Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? An
Empirical Test of Congressional Control over Judicial Behavior, January 2014
Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine? January
2014
Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, January 2014
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Voting Rules in International Organizations, January
2014
John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, February 2014
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Roles in Nonjudicial Functions, February
2014
Aziz Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, February 2014
Jennifer Nou, Sub-regulating Elections, February 2014
Albert W. Alschuler, Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator Leahy’s Proposal
to “Fix” Skilling v. United States, February 2014
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Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, February 2014
Brian Leiter, Preface to the Paperback Edition of Why Tolerate Religion? February 2014
Jonathan S. Masur and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, March 2014
Eric A. Posner, Martii Koskenniemi on Human Rights: An Empirical Perspective, March
2014

